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Book Reviews
Fritz Allhoff, Adam henschke and Bradley Jay strAwser (eds.). Binary Bullets. 
The Ethics of Cyberware. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 296 pp.
How can one prevent one’s enemy from developing nuclear weapons? In former 
times, i.e. some 30 years ago, one flew an aerial attack against what was supposed to 
be a nuclear site, as did Israel against a Libyan site. This can still be done today, but 
with the difference that it is possible nowadays to paralyze, via a previous cyberattack, 
the anti-aircraft weapons of one’s enemy – as did Israel when it attacked an alleged 
experimental site in Syria. Bombing sites in Syria or Libya is one thing, attacking a 
nuclear site in Iran is another thing. It is hard to imagine bombing a site in Iran. Yet 
it is not hard to imagine a cyberattack on an Iranian site. In fact, Stuxnet was not a 
fiction, but a real attack against an Iranian site. A so-called ‘worm’ was introduced into 
Iranian computer programs controlling enrichment centrifuges. Not only did the worm 
wreak havoc, but it was programmed to alter computer readouts, i.e. the Iranian 
nuclear technicians did not notice that something was wrong. As a result of this – 
more than probably conjoint US-Israeli cyberattack – the Iranian nuclear program was 
slowed down.
Though cyberattacks are still rare, they are not likely to remain so in the future. 
Hence the necessity to submit the question of the legitimacy of such attacks to ethical 
reflection. Several volumes – articles, monographs and essay collections – dedicated to 
this problem have already been published and the twelve contributions contained in 
Binary Bullets pursue and refine reflections on the topic.
The first three contributions tackle foundational questions. In “Emerging Norms 
for Cyberwarfare”, George Lucas Jr. thinks that we should privilege a bottom-up to a 
top-down approach. Nations should not wait for an international organism or confer-
ence to issue binding international law, but practice should be taken as reflecting norms 
to which nations seem to see themselves as bound. Lucas identifies four such norms: 
(i) never target civilians deliberately; (ii) respect proportionality and do not cause more 
damage than strictly necessary, (iii) always be conscious that cyberattacks may be as 
devastating as bombings and (iv) when attacking, always choose weapons that will cause 
least damage.
In “The Emergence of International Legal Norms for Cyberconflict”, Michael 
Schmitt and Liis Vihul argue in favour of new hard laws. Even if existing international 
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law can be used as a frame of reference, cyberconflicts pose new problems and thus 
make it necessary to at least complement existing international law on warfare. The so-
called Tallinn Manual, mentioned in almost every contribution in the volume, might be 
seen as a starting-ground for norms specific to cyberconflicts.
Randall Dipert maintains in “Distinctive Ethical Issues of Cyberwarfare” that tra-
ditional just war doctrine is inadequate to cyberwarfare, as the latter is a kind of warfare 
that can be quite distinct from traditional warfare. According to Dipert, we are entering 
an epoch “[…] in which the worst weapons are not used and in which cyperpowers 
and others test the limits of what will be tolerated by the international community” (70). 
A US-Israeli aircraft attack against the Iranian site would probably have led to a declaration 
of war, the cyberattack did not.
The following two contributions to the volume deal with the question of whether 
cyberwarfare really is a kind of warfare. In his “Cyber Chevaucées. Cyberwar Can Happen”, 
David Whetman compares cyberattacks to medieval chevaucées, arguing that violence is 
not reducible to physical violence and that merely threatening violence or even simply 
showing off one’s ability to be physically violent, can also count as violence. Whetman 
argues that cyberattackers can undermine political legitimacy by showing that a govern-
ment cannot protect its citizens against cyberattacks. Given the fact that cyberattacks 
can come from anywhere and that it is often difficult to identify cyberattackers, govern-
ments do not really know how to neutralize cyberattackers.
At the beginning of “Cyberwarfare as Ideal War”, Ryan Jenkins writes: “An ideal 
war would be a war wherein civilian casualties were minimal or nonexistent and where 
acts of violence perfectly discriminated between combatants and noncombatants” (89). 
According to Jenkins, cyberwarfare, if judiciously led, could be such an ideal form of 
war. As such, it would be morally obligatory.
Whereas the authors discussed until now concentrate mainly on ius ad bellum and 
ius in bello, Brian Drend, in “Postcyber. Dealing with the Aftermath of Cyberattacks” 
reflects on ius post bellum, arguing that the best post-cyberwarfare politics consists in 
helping the defeated party to be better off than before. This does not exclude sanctions 
against those who were responsible for provoking the war.
The three following contributions to the volume concentrate on the ethos of 
 warfare, stressing not so much – if at all – formal rules of morality or of law, but the 
character traits of those who have to fight cyberwars. While machines or programs play 
an important part in cyberwarfare, these machines or programs need humans to make 
them work or utilize them.
According to Matthew Beard’s thesis defended in “Beyond Tallinn. The Code of 
the Cyberwarrior?”, the same code of honour cannot be applied to cyberwarriors as to 
conventional warriors, since both types of war differ dramatically. Three different tasks 
might be given to the cyberwarrior: espionage, sabotage and assassination. According to 
Beard, assassination should be prohibited by the code of honour of cyberwarriors 
because one cannot easily determine who is the perpetrator. And as to the other two 
tasks, the cyberwarrior should display such virtues as discernment, discretion, numerical 
competence as well as autonomy and independent thinking.
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In their contribution ‘Immune from Cyberfire?”, Canetti, Gross and Waismel-
Manor insist on the psychological harm that cyberattacks can cause, especially when 
civilians are targeted – a targeting which amounts to cyberterrorism. The latter “[…] 
stokes anxieties about loss of control and unpredictability that might be as inescapable 
as those accompanying war and kinetic terrorism” (167). The authors come to the conclu-
sion that non-combatants should be protected against cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.
David and Joseph Danks’ “Beyond Machines” draws attention to the fact that the 
human beings leading cyberwars are not perfectly rational agents and that this should 
always be taken into account. Whatever the place taken by machines in cyberwarfare, 
we should always, as the authors formulate it, “[k]eep […] [h]umans in the [p]icture” 
(193), and we should also never forget when setting up an ethics for cyberwarfare that 
these humans are imperfect beings.
The last three contributions are grouped under the general heading Cyberwarfare, 
Deception, and Privacy. “Cyber Perfidy, Ruse, and Deception” by Heather Roff and 
“Cyberattacks and ‘Dirty Hands’” by Seumas Miller both take up the question whether, 
and if so to what extent, one is authorized to use morally problematic means when 
fighting an enemy. Roff argues that when deceptive cyberactions directly lead to the 
killing, wounding or capturing of an enemy, they amount to perfidy and are morally 
illegitimate. The litmus-test is whether an action will undermine trust or not. To quote 
Roff: “Perfidious action in warfare heightens distrust and enmity, and it follows that if 
cyberoperations are considered perfidious, then peaceful settlements will also be more 
difficult to achieve, for they will have further undermined trust” (223).
Miller compares cyberattacks to covert political actions, considering the latter as 
“[…] a paradigm of dirty hands: doing what is wrong in order to achieve some (alleg-
edly) greater good” (239). The author justifies cyberattacks, provided they respect the 
principles of self-defence, necessity, proportionality, discrimination and reciprocity. 
Moreover, the privacy rights of individuals should be respected.
The said privacy rights are also central to Michael Skerker’s “Moral Concerns with 
Cyberespionage”. Cyberespionage under the form of data-collection is legitimate pro-
vided it is done by a trustworthy government and for a morally justifiable purpose. 
Moreover, human autonomy should always be respected.
It is to be expected that cyberoperations will play an ever greater role in the years 
to come, either as preliminaries to conventional warfare operations – e.g. the deactiva-
tion of an enemy radar system to make it impossible to detect bombers – or as outright 
war-operations – e.g. introducing malware into a computer system controlling nuclear 
fission in a nuclear plant to provoke an uncontrolled chain reaction. The worst of cyber-
warfare is still in ahead of us. Whether it will be worse than the worst of conventional 
warfare we have seen up to now remains to be seen. It is a question one would like to 
answer in the negative, but it is still too early to be optimistic in this regard.
The essays contained in this volume are not – and do not pretend to be – the last 
word on the issue of the ethics of cyberwar. Nevertheless, they already go well beyond 
mere exploratory remarks and identification of problems or problem-fields. They open 
up avenues for further reflections. They also confront us with the question: which kind 
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of war do we want – provided we want a war? Public opinion, at least in democracies, 
should have something to say concerning this question. While political realism makes it 
necessary to take the existence of cyberwarfare as given and to ask whether and how 
ethical limits can and should be drawn, we should also be able to step back and ask 
whether it would not be better to renounce cyberwarfare completely. While cyberwarfare 
might have the potential to lead to destructionless wars, it also has the potential to 
initiate massive destruction. As such, it is a two-edged sword. and in addition to asking 
the pragmatic question “What can we do in order to reduce the risk of using the destruc-
tive side of the sword?” we should also take time to ask the fundamental question “Do 
we want a (new) double-edged sword at all?”
Norbert Campagna
Université du Luxembourg 
Dale Dorsey. The Limits of Moral Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016. 233 pp.
In his book on the normative authority of morality, Dale Dorsey addresses the conflict 
between the ‘plausible’ intuition that morality requires universal ‘impartiality’ to override 
personal interests (PMI) and the implications of such requirements that go against our 
other rational views. Is the ‘moral standpoint’ mandatory for us at all times and in every 
circumstance? The burden seems overwhelming. This is ‘the question’, stated as an 
attempt to establish the relationship between acting according to moral requirements 
and how one ought to live. The more famous of the objections that he addresses is 
known as the ‘demandingness objection’. Similar in content are the cases in which 
morality understood as ‘reason-as-such’ stumble into other (moral or non-moral) reasons 
in favour of the ‘dearest and nearest’. The Limits of Moral Authority offers a broad pre-
sentation of practical rationality and morality, however, which is more consistent than 
the mere sum of its arguments.
The perplexity facing the (excessive) demands of moral requirements already 
guided Dorsey’s inquiry to some extent in his previous book (The Basic Minimum: 
A Welfarist Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). He raises questions 
such as: given two smaller communities, one faring well and another struck by famine, 
which one should society help? Why is it so clear that it ought to help the community 
that is worse off? Why should all other considerations be discarded? The ‘demanding-
ness objection’ was also the main question in the author’s paper “Weak Anti-Rationalism 
and the Demands of Morality” (Noûs 46/1 [2012]: 1-23). In this new volume, the question 
(with many of its ramifications) comes to the foreground, superseding political or social 
problems, even those that keep him awake at night (does his weak anti-rationalism not 
justify ‘jerks’ and the selfish wealthy in following their whims and discard any moral 
demands entirely?).
The question of practical (moral) conflicts is presented as follows: “My family and I 
have agreed to take a group vacation […]. The time has come to book our tickets. But 
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before we can do so, a natural disaster strikes an extraordinarily impoverished country, 
leaving hundreds of thousands of people homeless […]. My own view is that doing 
something to help is morally required. [… but to] cancel now would be the worst sort 
of disappointment. After all, my family and I really want to go. Also, it’s something I 
feel I owe them” (1).
The picture is sketched in this somewhat pedestrian way in the introduction – if 
compared, for example, to Max Weber’s despair in the face of the choice between sav-
ing one’s soul or the city, or Isaiah Berlin’s values conflict. Although the reductio ad 
Hitlerum (Hitler, Sartre’s apathy and the justifications of a Nazi gatekeeper surface several 
times) eventually finds its place in the book, the tone is never of a deep inner struggle 
between the demands of universal morality and the fragility of goodness. Moreover, 
‘prudential’ considerations also take the ‘virtue’ of prudence as a shallow calculation 
between self-interest and ‘common good’. Given these platitudes, the book’s presenta-
tion (or its beginning) is not at first glance promising.
Even more surprising, however, is the author’s hasty use of a brief definition/
description to solve the dichotomy between facts and values that has plagued morality 
and political life since Hume’s dilemma (18) or Kant’s ‘stratagem’ (213 ff.): morality is 
just one among several possible standpoints. “In its most basic distillation, a standpoint 
takes as inputs certain facts about a given action, assigns a particular importance (or 
‘strength’) to these facts, and generates an evaluative output: an assignment of ‘good,’ 
‘bad,’ ‘required,’ ‘permissible,’ etc., to the action in question” (9).
There are, however, two powerful reasons to read carefully what is otherwise a 
remarkably well-thought out and organized book, full of roadmaps, signposts, summaries, 
and conclusions.
On one hand, the puzzle is a real one, at the very least from a subjective perspective: 
“When trying to decide whether to take a family vacation or not, I consider not just 
morality, but also prudence, etiquette, and norms of friendship and family. Each of these 
picks out a distinct standpoint of normative inquiry” (9).
Obviously, it is tempting for this reviewer to let the author (and his family) go 
on vacation, and even encourage Lee, Chris and many others fictitious characters to 
pay for their sons’ costly top-notch high school or college instead of donating their 
money to Oxfam (the recurrent dilemma afflicting many people in the book). In other 
words, to dismiss these rather shallow inner struggles as merely artificial conflicts, 
taking the view that moral permissions and duties should always take supremacy, there-
fore fully endorsing what the author calls ‘moral rationalism’. Or even to uphold a 
theory that is closer to the author’s heart, namely Douglas W. Portmore’s defence of 
mild consequentialism (Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): moral rationalism sets constraints on moral 
theories, and some forms of act-consequentialism may be incorporated in practical 
reason in a way that does not violate such constraints. But is it that easy to reconcile 
all these viewpoints or is this attempt at dismissal not merely a distorted view of 
human morality and even a contradiction in terms – as Isaiah Berlin, for example, 
contends?
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It is very tempting, nevertheless, to defuse these apparent conflicts and discard the 
main thesis of the book with them, especially because among the many arguments 
debated and accepted or rejected as ‘plausible’ or ‘non-plausible’, some theories do 
explain the specific conflict/contradictions under examination. Samuel Scheffler’s ‘par-
tiality’ (“Morality and Reasonable Partiality.” In Partiality and Impartiality. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1994, 100-107), Brian Barry’s not so demanding ‘impartiality’ (Justice as Impar-
tiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 191), and the double meaning of morality 
as either a set of basic rules and an ideal of excellence in behaviour (James Dreier. 
“Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t.” In Satisficing and 
Maximizing. Edited by Michael Byron, 131-154 [149]. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) are among the theories that are too hastily dismissed.
On the other hand, this is a challenging book, full of interesting arguments and 
very readable, notwithstanding (or because of) the evidently impressive scholarship in 
recent analytical moral theory (with the occasional reference to a classical book thrown 
in). Chapter 1 is devoted to clarifying the concepts the author uses throughout the book, 
and it is apparently a mere ‘stage-setter’. But while anticipating the objection that there 
is no independent notion of practical rationality (based on Copps’s normative pluralism), 
he in fact argues that there is reason for accepting the sui generis normative standpoint 
of ‘reason-as-such’, from which the unscripted ought is the result (39). Chapter 2 
addresses the problem of the method in moral inquiry and attacks a priori moral rational-
ism, that is, the view that moral considerations are supreme and a limiting condition 
(‘thou shall not kill, period’) and that if we take all moral considerations seriously, there 
is no theoretical conflict. His purpose is to contrast it with ‘substantive rationalism’ that 
entails an analysis of the reasons for action, dismissing in passing some criticisms of the 
famous defence of anti-rationalism by Philippa Foot. In chapters 3 and 4 Dorsey puts 
forward the core of his vision: there is good reason for accepting “[…] an impartial, and 
hence demanding, theory of morality” (70); but there is also a ground for the denial of 
the ‘supremacy’ of the moral standpoint (as in Thomas Nagel, 207-210) and therefore 
moral anti-rationalism is the best way to ‘accommodate’ the existence of heroic actions 
that are not normatively implied or required on grounds of how one should live, called 
‘supererogatory actions’ (70). The more controversial points are made in chapters 5 and 
6, where the author maintains that it is not irrational not to follow moral norms. He falls 
short of Bernard Williams’s position – we would be “better off without” (86) –, but 
morality for Dorsey is merely a set of ‘by default’ reasons (or permissions) for action 
and we possess a “[…] capacity to strengthen practical reasons” through the “normative 
significance of the self” (173-180). This theory is also presented in the paper “Ground-
ing, Priority, and the Normative Significance of Self” (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 
10/1 [2016]: 1-24), but ignores an obvious alternative: with due apologies to Jean-Paul, 
Sartre behaved as a selfish brat and he is merely excusing himself, claiming a political 
stance he never upholds – but certainly later hyper-compensated navigating the ‘wave 
of the future’.
The assumption that pervades the book is that morality is independent of human 
desires and ends: “[…] whatever theory of practical reasons is true will allow us to 
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determine the first order of content of normativity on the basis of a reflective equilib-
rium of our considered judgments concerning how we should live” (6; fully clarified in 
the appendix “FYO”). Defining morality as impartiality and henceforth using the reflec-
tive equilibrium as a method ignoring the appeal to a view of the moral person is the 
deep reason why Dorsey’s conclusion is to some extent unavoidable.
If one puts forward the standards or demands of morality as a form of moral 
constructivism in the attempt to avoid any ideal conception of personhood, naturally 
something is amiss in the relationship between the morality standpoint and normative 
authority.
Despite similarities in terminology, this is not Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. 
When Rawls presents the aim of his Dewey Lectures in 1980, he begins by saying that 
he merely wishes to examine the notion of a “constructivist moral conception” (John 
Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism.” In Collected Papers, 303. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), although one of a specific kind: a Kantian constructivism, although he 
acknowledges that “[…] justice as fairness is not, plainly, Kant’s view, strictly speaking” 
(1999, 304). Rawls is using the qualification ‘Kantian’ as an analogy and not quite as an 
accurate interpretation, but he still wants it to resemble Kant’s fundamental aspects 
(1999, 304-305). He ventures to do so because constructivism is much less well under-
stood than “utilitarianism, perfectionism, and intuitionism” (303). Indeed, in the third 
lecture Rawls presents how a Kantian doctrine “[…] interprets the notion of objectivity 
in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view” (1999, 340), following Henry 
Sidgwick’s efforts to build a method of ethics that he considers the first truly consistent 
work in modern moral theory (1999, 341). Yet, Rawls still points out two important 
limitations to Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics: firstly, Sidgwick pays little attention to the 
notion of ‘personhood’ and the social importance of morality; and secondly, Sidgwick 
fails to recognize that both Kant’s doctrine as well as perfectionism have a distinctive 
ethical method. Both Kantian doctrine and moral perfectionism are much more than a 
formal account of the principles of equity; both include a view of the moral person 
(1999, 342).
Perhaps a view of moral personhood, its purposes and desires, can only be 
entirely ignored at the cost of concluding in the end, as Dorsey argues, that we are 
not always required and even permitted (in all circumstances, or all-things-considered) 
to act morally according to the reason-as-such standpoint. This is a strong conclusion 
– a bold claim that is in practice prey to all (moral and non-moral) justifications for 
action and inaction – akin to the full-fledged subjectivism that he seeks to avoid with 
a ‘default’ PMI. He does not go as far as eschewing morality, but may turn us all 
into ‘budding utilitarians’ in a final attempt to evade subjectivism. This was the pur-
pose of David Brink’s paper: “Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View” 
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Cécile fAbre. Cosmopolitan Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 368 pp.
This is a companion to, and completion of, Fabre’s earlier Cosmopolitan War (Oxford 
University Press, 2012). In the earlier book, Fabre provided a sustained analytical engage-
ment with the justification of warfare and the governance of its conduct. The text under 
review (which can be read independently of the first book) addresses all and only the 
normative implications of ending conflicts. An underlying set of cosmopolitan assump-
tions guide the work. These principles concern the ultimate reducibility of justified 
political claims to individual rights and the conditions necessary to preserve individual 
status. Bringing these principles to bear on the phenomenon of armed conflict is doubly 
daunting, requiring the application of general principles to an already morally compro-
mised activity, and doing this for every aspect of warfare from the instigation of hostil-
ity to its symbolic memorialisation. This work carries on and completes the project 
admirably. By implication, however, the scope of the project means that this is a special-
ist text for those already familiar with some of the background philosophical, legal, or 
social scientific debates and would not easily serve as an introduction to them.
The contents cover cessation of hostilities, peace treaties, reparations, and prosecu-
tions. We also have sustained analysis of transitional arrangements, for instance 
international trusteeships and other forms of external governance, as well as reconcilia-
tion and remembrance. The themes in this text take us through the ending of war to 
the memory of that war, be it distilled into legal narratives or physical memorials. The 
intensity of the argument throughout is impressive (there is rarely a claim that does not 
receive its full share of qualifications and caveats) and the argumentation draws on a 
wide and solid grounding in the social sciences and history of conflicts. Actual case 
studies in terms of sustained analysis of historical examples are relatively infrequent, but 
they include the Peace of Versailles, the Nuremburg Trials, and foreign administration 
of East Timor and Bosnia. In essence, the text is a dense network of arguments tracing 
the normative themes that arise when states and combatants move from a state of war 
to a state of peace.
In contrast to other related works, it really is a synoptic view of the field. It is 
distinct from specialist legal concern with the UN Charter rules and the rules of inter-
national criminal law. And it is also distinct from specialist concern with historical and 
social scientific analysis of the field, approaches that are often content to draw less 
systematic conclusions about the legitimacy of the ends of a conflict or the means used 
to pursue them. Moreover, it is refreshing that the analysis resists the dichotomies that 
are all too common in this area, principally peace versus justice and prosecution versus 
amnesty. There is no presumption that trade-offs must be found in limiting legal 
accountability through amnesties. Nor is it assumed that the moral superiority of one 
party, given their justification for use of armed force, necessarily places them in a morally 
decisive position regarding the rights of aggressor parties.
The success of this approach depends upon the defensibility of the cosmopolitan 
principles that frame the project as well as the means by which they are operationalised. 
The principles themselves are an expression of moral and institutional cosmopolitanism, 
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which takes the status of the individual to justify political institutions. Our groups and 
institutions can claim rightful authority over us only to the extent that they have a claim 
to defend individual rights. Thus at an individual level “[…] membership in certain 
groups alone does not affect individuals’ human rights – rights, that is, to the freedoms 
and resources they need to lead a flourishing life” (3). At the level of institutional author-
ity: “[…] to the extent that institutions can best achieve both relevant knowledge of 
which policies will best bring about justice and the high degree of cooperation between 
duty-holders that the discharge of those duties requires, individuals’ primary duty of 
justice is to those institutions” (4). That is to say, while there are grounds for reforming 
institutions, including international institutions, the principal focus here is the moral 
entitlements of individuals and the reducibility of the claims of states (not least sovereign 
inviolability) to the rights of individuals within the state. The operationalising of those 
principles takes place through certain familiar rules, or conceptualisations of those rules, 
with cosmopolitan interpretations. So a ‘just cause’ requirement for waging justified war 
takes its meaning from individual rights and should not be read through other (typically 
Thomist) lenses. Again, ideas like ‘discrimination’ and ‘proportionality’ familiar from 
humanitarian law (meaning, respectively, avoidance of civilian casualties and choice of 
legitimate military means relative to ends) likewise take their meaning from the rights 
and the individuals they protect not the specific legal meanings in humanitarian law.
The other principal analytical device is the idea of the ‘all things considered’ stan-
dard. Justice in this context faces considerable obstacles: “[…] epistemic constraints, 
resource constraints […], and agents’ unwillingness to accept just terms” (19). While far 
from endorsing ‘non-ideal theory’ (which Fabre treats as equivalent to feasibility tests 
not relevant to this domain) the possibility of distinguishing ‘just peace’ from a ‘just 
peace all things considered’ provides the analytical tool necessary to distinguish principled 
but unconditioned moral claims, from principled but conditioned, given the context of warfare, 
claims. The latter are principled decisions about the fulfilment of a rights-determined 
standard of minimum acceptability, without that decision being merely pragmatic or 
consequentialist. The device is important as it gives due normative weight to the context 
in which decisions are being made, namely where the parties may have been morally 
compromised by their own conduct and ideal outcomes are impossible given tragic 
losses on both sides. It allows us to say a just peace (all things considered) would include 
“[…] a state of affairs where individuals do not enjoy all of their non-basic rights as a 
result [of certain common obstacles] but where they nevertheless enjoy their basic 
rights” (20). Conversely “[…] a peace settlement or state of affairs whereby basic rights 
are not secure and/or non-basic rights are under imminent threat of war is not a justified 
[all things considered] peace” (20). That the difference turns on enjoyment of rights is 
of course consistent with the cosmopolitan starting-points, and it is not difficult to 
defend its use in order to draw together certain ‘normal’ components of moral theory 
with the ‘abnormal’ aspects of warfare. The defensibility of the standard does, however, 
depend upon a division between basic and non-basic rights (one Fabre derives from the 
work of Henry Shue) and stands or falls on the intelligibility and consistent application 
of that division.
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The detailed and important arguments are too numerous to mention. Suffice it to 
say for present purposes, that there are interesting but problematic engagements with 
international criminal prosecutions and with repatriation. Regarding criminal prosecu-
tions, there is considerable literature in this area concerning both their underlying nor-
mative justification as well as their procedure, but Fabre rightly locates the core argu-
ment in rights: “[…] if one kind of wrongdoing warrants punishment, human rights 
violations certainly do” (180). The peculiarities of international criminal justice, however, 
make this more difficult to explicate than it at first appears. International crimes are not 
violations of human rights laws, and so special attention has to be given to the actual 
crimes prosecuted and their particular relationship with rights. The idea of crimes against 
humanity provides two options in this respect: that ‘humanity’ is a standard that is vio-
lated in the crimes, and ‘humanity’ is a constituency to which a perpetrator must answer. 
Fabre takes the second option (181) but the link back to rights then becomes stipulative 
rather than reasoned: “In sum […] crimes against humanity are violations of basic 
human rights, period” (182). The broad conclusion here is difficult to disagree with, but 
it stands and falls on the earlier division between basic versus non-basic rights and on 
whether basic rights are such that their existence, from a cosmopolitan point of view, 
must be defended by prosecutions in circumstances of their violation. For Fabre, as for 
Kant, the ultimate justification of prosecutions is that “[…] punishing war wrongdoers 
is not merely justified as a matter of right: it is also a moral imperative, failure to respect 
which is, more deeply and at least prima facie, a failure properly to respect individuals’ 
human rights” (217). But the fact that amnesties might also be for Fabre necessary in an 
all things considered judgment (213) reveals that there is something of an oscillation at 
work here: a ‘requirement to punish egregious rights violations’ and ‘the requirement to 
pursue an all things considered justified peace’. While she avoids generalised dichoto-
mies between justice and peace, a tension of this kind seems unavoidable.
There is also an interesting discussion of reparations, including discussions of res-
titution generally and the repatriation of looted property specifically. It is quite striking 
that Fabre’s background assumption with regard to returning looted property is that 
most property distributions in the world are already unjust and, as such, (re)distribution 
of stolen property after warfare will have to rest upon its own all things considered 
standard rather than any strict application of property law. This position is worth noting 
at length:
[W]hether private owners of confiscated artefacts were in morally rightful possession 
of the latter at the time of occupation is doubtful too (at the risk of being controver-
sial). For under no plausible description of the world as it stood in 1939 can it be held 
that it was a just world – a world, that is, where all individuals, wherever they resided, 
enjoyed prospects for a flourishing life. To bring about a just world then would have 
required heavier taxation and considerably more stringent restrictions on inheritance 
than were in fact imposed. In so far as there are overwhelmingly good reasons to 
believe that those who were in legal rightful possession of those objects were not in 
fact their rightful owners, it is not clear that they have a restitutive claim (128).
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This assertion seems to mark a sudden transition to concern with the conditions of 
global justice rather than cosmopolitan rights. Unlike the latter, the former requires a 
rethinking of the boundaries between rightful ownership and morally justified ownership 
(along with the boundary between the obligatory and the supererogatory) such that any 
and all property claims must be reassessed in the light of principles of global distributive 
justice. A less radical alternative would be to join post-war judges and jurists in grappling 
with individual property claims in the light of the clash between war-time and post-war 
legal systems and the potential for the latter to negate the authority of the former qua 
law. This is a perennially interesting and challenging debate in jurisprudence that Fabre 
perhaps understandably leaves aside. Nonetheless, the proposed solution of calling into 
question, from the outset, the rightfulness of the global distribution of property is a 
radical one whose defensibility stands outside the scope of this text.
These difficulties aside, the volume is powerful and impressive, and Fabre should 
be thanked for providing such a systematic and unique body of work.
Stephen Riley
Utrecht University
Sarah hAnnAn, Samantha brennAn and Richard Vernon (eds.). Permissible 
Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 267 pp.
The eleven contributions in this volume ask questions that hardly anybody who has 
parented a child has asked themselves before deciding – if it was even a decision in the 
strict sense of the word – to become a parent. Yet they are important questions, as they 
make us aware that parenting involves responsibilities, and sometimes deeper respon-
sibilities than those one is consciously aware of. Prospective parents generally know 
that they will have duties towards the child they intend to create if that child is born, 
but before even envisaging these duties, they should stop for a moment and ask them-
selves whether bringing a child into the world is not, perhaps, already an irresponsible 
act.
This is the question raised by David Benatar in “The Misanthropic Argument for 
Anti-Natalism”. In what to some may seem a shocking, to others a lucid picture of 
humankind, Benatar argues that creating new people is something like an aesthetic disas-
ter, not to speak of all the other destructions and miseries human beings are responsible 
for: “But how many more producers of excrement and urine, flatulence, menstrual blood 
and semen, sweat, mucus, vomit, and pus do we really need?” (58). “None”, is the 
answer Benatar expects to this rhetorical question, such that for him the only respon-
sible attitude would be anti-natalism, i.e. the refusal to procreate. He calls his argument 
misanthropic because, unlike the philanthropic argument that sees human beings primar-
ily as victims of mainly natural disasters, it sees human beings as the perpetrators of 
massive disasters. Humanity is fundamentally evil, and the only way to eliminate this evil 
is to stop creating new people.
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While not as provocative and radical as Benatar’s contribution, Corey MacIver’s 
“Procreation or Appropriation?” starts from the premise that we should stop seeing the 
decision to procreate as being a purely private decision. To create a new person, the 
author claims, is to create “a new set of claims to natural goods” (113), and, MacIver 
continues, “[…] procreative decisions are by far the most ecologically significant 
 decisions that individuals will make in their lives” (117). As natural resources are not 
unlimited, procreative rights may not be conceived as unlimited either, so that, to quote 
again, “[…] there will be a point at which procreative behavior will be legitimately sub-
ject to scrutiny or intervention by others” (122). The more a newly created human being 
will impact upon natural goods, the more the creation of such a human being will be a 
legitimate object of public scrutiny.
In “Do Motives Matter?”, Steven Lecce and Erik Magnusson are not so much 
worried about ecological impacts as about the cultural impact of procreation. While they 
make it clear that there may be many acceptable motives for having children, they 
maintain nevertheless that there are also unacceptable reasons and that a liberal state 
may intervene and prohibit procreation in certain cases. Prospective procreators, 
according to the authors, “[…] must comply with, not be motivated by, politically liberal 
values” (162). This amounts to saying that prospective procreators may not be motivated 
by politically illiberal values – although they need not be consciously motivated by liberal 
values. Thus, it would not be permitted to have children in order to enrich oneself by 
selling them into servitude. Lecce and Magnusson insist, however, that a liberal state 
may not intervene in procreative decisions on the basis of a certain conception of the 
good.
In “Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?”, Anea Gheaus defends the 
thesis that we have a collective duty to create new people, arguing that if humanity ever 
decides to stop having children, “[…] the last people to be alive will be deprived of the 
good of living in an institutionally organized society that can regulate and legitimize the 
uses of power” (95). According to Gheaus, children already now existing may need the 
work of future people if they are to live decent lives. As we have a duty to prevent evil 
and as the decision not to procreate will cause evil in the future, we have a duty to 
procreate. It seems here that Gheaus overlooks the fact that ‘the last people to be alive’ 
will have had the opportunity to procreate and that if they have decided not to, the 
state-of-nature kind of life they will live at the end of – human – times will be a conse-
quence of their own decision. Suppose A who is 20 has no children and does not want 
any and B who is 40 has a child. When B’s child is 80, there will be no children or 
grand-children of A around to look after him or her. But then, B’s child could have 
procreated at 40, to ensure that he or she had someone to look after him or her. In 
short: we do not need a duty where enlightened long-term self-interest seems to suffice. 
This makes it also somewhat pointless to reflect on how to enforce the duty to have 
children. Rejecting, for obvious reasons, enforced pregnancies, Gheaus nevertheless 
defends the idea of something like coerced gamete donation with, in a not too far off 
future, extra-uterine pregnancies. Child-rearing could also be made easier to induce more 
people to procreate.
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Jurgen de Wispelaere and Daniel Weinstock, for their part, raise the question of 
“Privileging Adoption Over Sexual Reproduction?”. They confront us with a trilemma: 
(i) the state must find parents for children in need of adoption, (ii) the state may not 
infringe on the basic rights of prospective parents, and (iii) children born through sexual 
reproduction to still living parents may not be penalized indirectly by their parents being 
penalized for having chosen biological parenting over adoption. While satisfying these 
three conditions simultaneously may look like squaring the circle, the authors try to 
show that the state can do certain things to promote adoption. At a cultural level, it can 
promote the idea that social parenting is as good a form of parenting as biological par-
enting. At an administrative level, it can eliminate obstacles to adoption. Finally, at the 
financial level, it can socialize adoption costs. Through all these measures, adoption can 
be made more attractive.
In “Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the Status Quo on Parental Licensing?”, 
Andrew Botterel and Carolyn McLeod likewise tackle the question of adoption and 
argue that it is unjustified for the state to demand licensing for adoptive, but not for 
biological parents. They maintain that a right to biological reproduction can be grounded 
neither in an interest in biological reproduction or in rearing one’s own biological chil-
dren, nor in a right to bodily autonomy. Lacking sufficient grounding, this right cannot 
be used to treat differently those who can reproduce sexually and those who cannot and 
want to adopt. Hence, if people who reproduce sexually can have children of their own 
without prior controls by public authorities aimed at determining whether they will be 
good parents, people who want to adopt children also should not be subjected to such 
a priori controls.
Whereas Botterel and McLeod question traditional justifications for the acceptance 
of a right to reproduce sexually, Elizabeth Brake defends one type – in her eyes the only 
acceptable – of justification for genetic ties in her “Creation Theory: Do Genetic Ties 
Matter?”. According to Brake, procreation and insisting on genetic ties can be justified 
where there are some valuable human traits to be passed on and where these traits can-
not be transmitted otherwise than by genetics. This position confronts us with the 
question of what are to be considered valuable traits. For some, being deaf may be a 
valuable trait whereas for most people it is not. So either we let people determine indi-
vidually what is a valuable trait, or some authority decides what is valuable and what is 
not. Neither solution seems to be satisfactory.
Krishnamurthy’s and MacLeod’s contributions tackle the question of competency, 
albeit from different angles. In “We Can Make Rational Decisions to Have a Child: On 
the Grounds for Rejecting L.A. Paul’s Arguments”, Meena Krishnamurthy argues, against 
Paul, that even though would-be parents cannot strictly be said to know what it is like to 
be a parent of a child of one’s own, this epistemic defect does not preclude rational deci-
sions to procreate. According to Krishnamurthy, we can know what it is to have a child, 
as we may play with, feed, etc. children who are not our own. Moreover, we might want 
not only to have a child of our own, but also the transformative experience that goes 
with it. And we might have good reasons to want to have such a transformative experi-
ence rather than to miss it. Finally, requiring full-fledged knowledge to make a rational 
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decision to procreate is a rather strict condition that is hardly ever fulfilled in other situ-
ations. All in all, the decision to have a child may be rationally motivated.
Colin MacLeod focusses his attention on “Parental Competency and the Right to 
Parent” in contrast to parental competency to make rational decisions to procreate. 
According to MacLeod, parents must be able to furnish a child with what is in strict 
justice due to him or her. The author thus situates himself between two extreme posi-
tions. On the one hand, we have parents who do not care for their children and neglect 
them. On the other hand, we find ideal or optimal parents. Parents need not belong to 
this second category in order to fulfil the conditions required for a right to parent, but 
should they not fulfil the conditions linked to strict justice, they have no right to procreate. 
MacLeod is of course well aware of the fact that parents do not live in a vacuum, but 
in a certain type of society. Hence the requirement that public authorities should help 
parents fulfil the conditions required by a right to parent as far as possible.
Matthew Clayton’s “How Much Do We Owe to Children?” also takes up the ques-
tion of what entitlements children have. Taking up ideas from Rawls and complement-
ing them with ideas from Dworkin, Clayton comes to the conclusion that “[…] we are 
entitled to the childhood provision that would be chosen by equally placed well-informed 
individuals tasked with the responsibility of allocating resources across their own lives” 
(261). While we should not rest content with giving children a merely decent life, we are 
nevertheless not obliged to give them the best life possible as a child.
The contributions in this volume extend from Benatar’s anti-natalism to Marsh’s 
appeal for a systematic defence of procreation (in “Procreative Ethics and the Problem 
of Evil”). Hence the question mark in the title: Permissible Progeny? The book does not 
give a definite answer to the question, but illuminates it from different points of view. 
While the range of arguments presented is extensive, there are still additional arguments 
that can be introduced on both sides of the debate. And as long as human beings con-
tinue to procreate, we can enjoy the prospect of ever better arguments that may be 




Richard Joyce. Essays in Moral Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
288 pp. 
Essays on Moral Scepticism is a collection of twelve essays by Richard Joyce, a leading 
contemporary proponent of moral scepticism. With one exception, all the essays have 
been published elsewhere already and, in case you are wondering, Richard Joyce is still 
alive – this is a rather rare case of a ‘Best Of’ of a living philosopher, and it bundles 
most of his publications from 2005 onward that relate to the topics of his previous 
monographs, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and The Evolution 
of Morality (MIT Press, 2006).
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Joyce defends a type of scepticism called the Moral Error Theory (MET). MET is 
a meta-ethical view about the nature of morality. It contains two major theses. The first 
is about the semantics of moral language. Error theorists argue that moral judgements 
express beliefs that commit us to the existence of objective moral properties. For 
instance, when we speak of something being morally wrong, we describe that something 
to be of a particular nature and ascribe certain properties to it; just as when we say that 
something is green, we ascribe the property of greenness to that thing. Importantly, 
error theorists claim that our use of moral language is an attempt to state objective truths 
and thus to ascribe properties of a very special kind (which is where the analogy to 
colour-terms breaks down): according to error theorists, when I say that everyone has 
the right to freedom of speech, then I mean to say that there is an objective fact about 
the matter of freedom of speech, a fact that exists quite independently of what anyone 
thinks about it. Note an important difference to the meaning of fictional language. Talk 
about Kafka’s character Gregor Samsa in The Metamorphosis, for example, who wakes up 
one morning as a bug, is not truth-apt: we talk about it as if it were true, but we do not 
intend to say that it is literally true. Most proponents of MET insists that the commit-
ment to literal objective truth is an irrevocable part of the meaning of moral terms.
The second thesis of the MET is metaphysical. It is about the nature of the moral 
properties and facts that we are supposedly speaking about when we are using moral 
language. For instance, claims about the goodness of freedom of speech are true, if they 
are true, in virtue of moral properties. Unfortunately, error theorists find no room for 
such properties or facts in the world that meet all the features that our moral talk 
demands. Hence, the eponymous synthesis of MET is the following: we talk as if there 
are objective moral facts (semantic thesis), but there are no objective moral facts (meta-
physical thesis), so all our moral judgements are false.
Joyce contributed both to the core claim of the MET, that morality is a myth 
(because all moral judgements are systematically false) and, seemingly in tension with 
this view, to the study of moral thought as an evolved capacity. The present volume 
seems partly intended to resolve this tension, as the title of its introduction suggests: 
“Morality: The Evolution of a Myth”. Joyce wants to explain why moral thinking is inex-
orably committed to the existence of moral facts, which, according to him, do not exist, 
and why the evolution of morality gives us additional reason to doubt our (epistemic) 
justification to hold moral beliefs.
The thematic connections between the essays in this volume and relations to 
Joyce’s previous work are evident, although seldom spelt out explicitly. And while each 
of the volume’s essays makes important points in its own right, the added synthetic 
benefit is rather limited; many scholars working on the MET will already be familiar 
with most of its content. 
Nonetheless, I would recommend reading the book for two reasons. First, Philoso-
phy-of-Joyce aficionados might appreciate the volume as a handy compendium of his 
recent work and the evolution of his ideas – especially since seven out of the twelve essays 
are from edited volumes, which might otherwise be difficult (or expensive) to obtain. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, Joyce’s introduction is both an exceptionally clear presentation 
— 160 —
 Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 1
ethical perspectives – march 2017
of the MET and a nuanced, insightful, and refreshingly open-minded reflection about its 
most contested points. Coming from one of the foremost defenders of the view, the 
introduction alone makes the volume required reading for scholars working on the MET.
I will not describe the contents of all individual chapters here, but instead focus 
briefly on the introduction and then highlight a few points about the single new essay 
presented in this volume.
The introduction is particularly valuable because erratic conceptions about the error 
theory abound. Here are a few, by way of example. Error theorists cannot consider 
something to be a reason for action because they argue that there are no moral facts. 
Error theorists like Joyce quite clearly deliberate and act nonetheless (he chose to publish 
this book, right?) so they are inconsistent. Alternatively, some think that error theorists 
must not teach moral philosophy because they think that all of morality is a scam. Last 
but not least, error theorists are perceived as being immoral monsters; after all, they 
claim that all moral claims are false!
As Joyce makes abundantly clear in the introduction, these worries are unfounded. 
The MET does not entail that it is (practically) misguided to make moral judgements, 
nor, necessarily, that we are unjustified in making moral judgements, nor that we should 
ignore normative claims. The ‘error’ in the error theory is a semantic error – we describe 
the world to be in a certain way, and, if you will, the world does not conform to our 
description. However, it might get close – surely there are values grounded in personal 
and societal relationships. Hence, error theorists might allow that there are myriad rea-
sons for us to be kind to each other, to defend freedom of speech, and to asks students 
to do their homework. However, error theorists maintain that these reasons are not 
objective in a profound sense; hence, we are misusing language.
Joyce’s frank clarification of the view and his focus on the technical aspects with 
which it is concerned (as opposed to sensational claims based on misconceptions – 
imagine the headline “Philosophers find out that Nothing is Ever Wrong!”) – also reveal 
a certain unstableness of the MET: it is affixed to a peculiar, highly contested, and dif-
ficult to prove understanding of the commitments incurred by making moral judge-
ments. It is easy to record that someone calls out stealing as ‘morally wrong’, but hard 
to ascertain whether he or she thereby means that ‘stealing is wrong in virtue of a fact 
that exists independently of what anyone thinks about it,’ and harder still to determine 
whether all users of moral judgements think along these lines. But if error theorists can-
not secure this point, then it seems much more plausible to think that moral judgements 
can be about less-than-fully objective facts and that we should not restrict (our use of) 
the term ‘moral’ to only such facts that are objective in this strong sense that is modelled 
upon the natural sciences.
The sole previously unpublished essay in this volume is “Evolution, Truth-Track-
ing, and Moral Skepticism”, which relates to the recent meta-ethical debate about evo-
lutionary debunking arguments. The unpublished manuscript has received considerable 
attention already – according to Google Scholar, it has been cited at least 15 times, as 
early as in 2013. For instance, Erik Wielenberg’s book Robust Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), discusses the article in some detail.
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Joyce reacts to critical discussions of the evolutionary debunking argument (EDA), 
which he defended in his book The Evolution of Morality. The conclusion of his original 
EDA was that all moral judgements are unjustified (Joyce 2006, 179-216).
Joyce clarifies how he wants to be understood. He concedes that our moral beliefs 
might prima facie be justified. However, genealogical considerations about our moral 
beliefs in general, and evolutionary considerations in particular, indicate that we do not 
have to assume that our moral beliefs being true played a role in us having them. This 
insight might not amount to an argument, Joyce acknowledges, but it nonetheless creates 
a challenge for proponents of objectivist views of morality: they have to explain how 
moral truth played a relevant role in the genealogy of our moral beliefs. Lacking such a 
story does not mean that all our moral beliefs are false, nor that all our moral beliefs are 
unjustified. Rather, many of our moral beliefs might be true, Joyce concedes, and they 
might be justified, but until proponents of objectivist views of morality have given us a 
plausible story as to why this is the case, the conclusion is that we do not know whether our 
moral beliefs are justified (156).
As Joyce recognises himself, his interpretation of the EDA might “[…] seem like 
something of a climb-down for the proponent of the EDA” (156) because the conclu-
sion softened from asserting that all moral judgements are unjustified to the claim that 
we simply do not know yet. 
Joyce thinks that this is not an issue, but, ultimately, it is a climb-down indeed. 
Debunking à la Joyce is to challenge realists to either show how we can align our moral 
beliefs with the available evidence (if one is speaking to an evidentialist, who believes 
that one’s available evidence is relevant for justification) or that we are using reliable 
methods to form true belief (if one is speaking to a reliabilist, who believes that a belief-
formation process is reliable insofar as it produces beliefs that track the truth). Since the 
massive onslaught of debunking arguments against objectivist views of morality began 
in 2006, partly due to Joyce’s monograph, many realists have produced precisely those 
explanations that Joyce demands: they explain why we should expect our moral beliefs 
to be sensitive to the evidence, or why we should expect them to be formed through 
reliable processes. Naturally, the plausibility of these answers should be scrutinised 
critically.
However, Joyce does not do that in this essay. He asserts that he is not convinced 
of any of the existing accounts, and he even writes that “[…] none of these debunkers 
of debunking has made a serious effort” to meet his challenge (155). That statement 
seems unfair, and it is certainly outdated: Wielenberg devotes a whole book to answer-
ing it (Wielenberg 2014).
The debunking debate evolves quickly, and Joyce’s essay has been discussed years 
before its publication in the present volume. The weird effect is that he demands a 
detailed answer to his debunking challenge, and asserts that nobody has made serious 
attempts to answer it (comparing realist explanations, in a “slightly cruel comparison” 
[155], to explanations of evolution proposed by Christian apologists), while there are 
monographs already published, with explanations that certainly seem sophisticated and 
not prone to easy dismissal as Joyce might be inclined.
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Joyce’s clarification of the challenge was only the first step. At the current state of 
the debate, we need to be clear about the success-criteria for answering the challenge. 
Given that Joyce’s clarification of the EDA grants so much to the realist it seems 
legitimate for realists like Wielenberg to claim that we know already that our moral beliefs 
are justified. If Joyce is not convinced, and for the record I am similarly disinclined, then 
we need to put criteria on the table that allow for sober discussion of the issue. I cannot 
find these criteria in Joyce’s present volume and so his presentation of the EDA is a 
climb-down indeed: it’s a challenge that realists have explicitly addressed at length, and 
as long as we do not know about plausible criteria to judge their answers the moral 
sceptic is – for the moment, I believe – silenced. 
Michael Klenk
Utrecht University
Frances M. kAmm. The Trolley Problem Mysteries. Edited by Eric Rakowski. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 272 pp. 
In the volume under review, Eric Rakowski offers a podium to some of the greatest 
philosophers of our time to discuss one of the most intriguing thought experiments in 
modern moral and political philosophy: the Trolley Problem. The main aim of the 
book is to give an account of some of the current positions in the debate, most nota-
bly those of Frances. M. Kamm and Judith Jarvis Thomson, rather than provide a 
comprehensive overview of the discussion. The book is organized as follows. Rakowski’s 
short introduction, which clearly establishes the terrain and explains the importance of 
Trolley Problem cases, is followed by two Tanner Lectures that Kamm delivered at 
Berkeley in 2013. Thereafter, Judith Jarvis Tomson, Thomas Hurka and Shelly Kagan 
each provide a commentary on the issues raised in those two lectures. In the final 
section, Kamm extensively replies to the commentaries, defending and clarifying her 
position.
Kamm’s first lecture deals with the following question: is it morally relevant to 
know who turned the trolley? More specifically, she wonders whether the permissibility 
of turning the trolley is affected by the fact that one would otherwise (a) kill others or 
(b) let others die. Consider the following two cases:
Trolley Driver: A runaway trolley is heading towards, and about to kill, five workmen 
down the track. The driver of the trolley could turn the trolley to a side-track where 
it will kill one worker instead.
Bystander : A runaway trolley is heading towards, and about to kill, five workmen down 
the track. A bystander could pull a lever that will turn the trolley to a side-track where 
it will kill one worker instead.
Does the permissibility of turning the trolley depend on whether one is the driver in 
Trolley Driver or the bystander in Bystander? This question is relevant because 
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Thomson, being one of the leading philosophers in the debate, recently changed her 
mind on this issue. Whereas she first thought that turning the trolley is permissible for 
both the driver and the bystander, she now thinks only the driver may turn the trolley 
and the bystander must let the five die. Kamm rejects Thomson’s new view and devotes 
her first lecture to arguing that the bystander as well as the driver are permitted to turn 
the trolley. While doing so, she questions Thomson’s arguments for the opposite posi-
tion. Kamm concludes that, insofar we are concerned with permissibility, it is, in almost 
all circumstances, morally irrelevant to know who turned the trolley.
In the second lecture, Kamm argues that what is relevant to solve trolley cases is 
to look at how the trolley was turned or, in other words, how the harm took place. 
She modestly suggests a principle, the Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH), which, or 
so she thinks, (quite) accurately explains our intuitions in the basic cases. The PPH holds 
that:
Actions are permissible if greater good or a component of it (or means having these as 
a noncausal flip side) leads to lesser harm even directly. Actions are impermissible if mere 
means that produce greater good […] cause lesser harm at least directly, and actions 
are impermissible if mere means cause lesser harms […] that are mere means to produc-
ing greater goods (66).
It is reassuring to find out one is not the only reader that finds this principle hard to 
understand. Thomson in particular points out that Kamm should put more effort into 
explaining her principle and its implications. Thomson asks, for example, “what does 
Kamm mean?” with the first sentence of the PPH (122), and she thinks Kamm need-
lessly discusses a broad range of difficult and “ornate” (124) hypothetical cases to 
explain the principle, the suggestions and conclusions of which remain underdeveloped 
(125).
Nevertheless, Kamm’s PPH is worth studying because it is grounded in a distinc-
tion that is original in the debate. Whereas most theories that try to explain our 
intuitions in trolley cases, like the killing/letting die distinction, only focus on the 
relationship between the actor (e.g. driver, bystander) and the victim(s) (e.g. the five, 
the one on the side-track), Kamm stresses that to solve trolley cases we should also 
look at inter-victim relationships, i.e. how the victims relate to one another. This is 
because one could imagine two trolley cases with two different conclusions with 
regards to the permissibility of producing harm in which the actor-victim relationships 
are the same but the inter-victim relationships are different. This suggests the moral 
relevance of inter-victim relationships. Compare Trolley Driver with Kamm’s Driver 
Topple case:
Driver Topple: A runaway trolley is heading towards, and about to kill, five workmen 
down the track. The driver of the trolley could press a switch that would topple a man, 
standing on a bridge, onto the track. The trolley would hit the man, thereby killing 
him. The collapse with the man would stop the trolley and, thus, save the five. 
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Kamm argues that while the actor-victim relationships in Trolley Driver and Driver 
Topple are the same, i.e. in both cases the driver would kill the one man (if he turns the 
trolley or presses the switch), the inter-victim relationships are relevantly different. If 
the driver turns the trolley in Trolley Driver, killing the one on the side-track is the 
‘noncausal flip side’ of saving the five. In other words, the lesser harm automatically 
follows from turning the trolley. Therefore, Kamm takes the inter-victim relationship in 
Trolley Driver, that is the relationship between the five and the one on the side-track, 
to be a case of ‘substitution’. Nevertheless, if the driver presses the switch in Driver 
Topple, this act causes a lesser harm (the death of the one) that itself serves as a mere 
means to producing a greater good (saving the five). In this case, or so Kamm defends, 
the inter-victim relationship is an example of ‘subordination’. Whereas it is permissible 
to merely substitute victims to produce the greater good, it is impermissible to subordi-
nate one victim to another, even if such subordination would produce a greater good. 
Therefore, Kamm thinks inter-victim relationships are also relevant to determine the 
permissibility of some instances of producing a lesser harm.
The criticisms of the three commentators mainly focus on two issues. The first is 
a rejection of the PPH. They all argue that the PPH does not come to the right conclu-
sions. Thomson thinks this is because the principle that is actually doing the work in 
most standard trolley cases is the distinction between killing and letting die, or between 
redirecting an already-existent threat and creating a new one. Hurka, on the other hand, 
does not suggest an alternative principle, but claims that the PPH has counterintuitive 
implications in both hypothetical and very realistic cases. Hurka and Kagan also argue 
that the PPH is not intrinsically appealing. For Hurka, this is because of the moral 
irrelevance of the distinction between ‘harm as a noncausal flip side’ and ‘harm as a 
means’, on which the PPH relies. Kagan thinks it is unclear what the distinction between 
‘subordination’ and ‘substitution’ entails and, even if it were clear, he questions why the 
distinction would be relevant to determine the permissibility of turning the trolley.
The second main concern in the commentaries relates to methodology. Kamm’s 
methodology, as is well-known, is case-based. She starts from hypothetical cases, tries 
to explain our intuitions, develops some general statements (i.e. a principle) that accom-
modate those explanations and then tests her conclusions with still more hypothetical 
cases. One issue with this method concerns the strong reliance on intuitions. Thomson 
thinks it is hard to figure out what intuitions we have in very complicated hypothetical 
cases. Kamm’s examples, indeed, range from standard trolley cases with one threat and 
two options (see Trolley Driver, Bystander and Driver Topple) to more ingenious 
situations with two threats and three options. Kagan points at another disadvantage of 
this methodology: we do not all seem to have the same intuitions, not even in the 
standard and relatively easy trolley cases. The drawbacks of the intuition-based meth-
odology could be counterbalanced by more abstract theorizing. Indeed, a well-devel-
oped moral theory with a plausible rationale that supports (most of) our intuitive 
conclusions would strengthen Kamm’s endeavour. But the lack of such a theory and 
rationale is precisely the second issue with her methodology that the commentaries 
stress. Kagan and Thomson in particular think Kamm wrongly exempts herself from 
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more fundamental moral theorizing. Moreover, Kagan thinks we should reject any 
principle, however well-suited to accommodate our intuitions, which has no plausible 
rationale.
This book is both a good introduction to the Trolley Problem as well as an 
advanced read on some of the current positions in the debate. Kamm’s two lectures 
introduce the reader to the debate and her methodology, and to their respective rele-
vance. In addition, Kamm considers what ‘the Trolley Problem’ actually entails, as this 
is not at all obvious based on the literature, and explains her solutions. At times the 
hypothetical examples and solutions get rather complicated, but that seems to be simply 
another aspect of the debate the reader has to get used to if he or she wishes to under-
stand what the Trolley Problem is about. In the end, after having read the commentar-
ies and Kamm’s replies, I believe most readers will remain puzzled with regard to their 
own intuitions and solutions. This is unproblematic, however, since the primary value 
of this book is probably that it demonstrates how uncertainty and inconclusiveness can 
go hand in hand with a commitment to strive for knowledge about the proper structure 
of our moral rights and duties. 
Kasper Ossenblok
Ghent University 
Alberta mAsAlA and Jonathan webber (eds.). From Personality to Virtue: Essays 
on the Philosophy of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 262 pp.
The volume under review collects several contributions on character, personality and 
virtue. The two editors – Alberto Masala is a postdoctoral researcher at the Sciences, 
Normes, Décision Research Centre of the Sorbonne and Jonathan Webber is a Reader in 
Philosophy at Cardiff University – have managed to bring together a selection of worthy 
authors from both Europe and the US. The essays vary considerably in argumentative 
technique and rhetorical presentation. In this regard, they reflect the broadening of 
influences and methodologies that characterizes the contemporary development of 
Anglophone academic philosophy, which might then be the binding element between 
the papers. As well as contributing to the growing collaboration between philosophers 
and psychologists in this area, the volume evidences the fading of a once luminous link 
between analytic and Continental Anglophone philosophers.
The volume is intended to consolidate and extend the growing rapprochement 
between philosophers and psychologists working on the nature and evaluation of 
human motivation. One of the common themes of these essays is the issue of the 
relation between empirical studies of motivation, philosophical treatments of charac-
ter, and the inspiration for both in Aristotle’s subtle and sophisticated treatment of 
character and motivation. A second underlying theme is a concern with the relation 
between an individual’s character and their social context. Although situationist exper-
iments often indicate the dependence of motivation on the social dimension of the 
situation, this aspect has played only a minor role in recent debate over their relevance 
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to the ethics of character. Put another way, these essays emphasize the Aristotelian 
idea of the individual as a social animal rather than subordinating it to the equally 
Aristotelian idea of a rational animal. The essays differ from many purely psycho-
logical studies of personality in emphasizing the dynamic nature of this aspect of 
motivation.
The growing philosophical investigation of the idea of individual character has the 
potential to transform both the consideration of personality and motivation in empirical 
psychology and the conception of virtue employed in philosophy. The essays are intended 
to contribute to this development through their analysis of the social aspect of character 
in the context of its dynamic aspect, particularly as this is played out through the contri-
bution of reasoning to character development. They intend to draw practical lessons from 
this investigation for educational and penal theory as well as for personal ethics.
Some of the papers in the volume can be brought together, others stand on their 
own. Two authors focus on penal theory. Jonathan Jacobs (John Jay College) opens the 
central discussion with an analysis of the idea of character and some of its implications 
for criminal punishment within a liberal political system. Katrina Sifferd (Elmhurst Col-
lege) augments this political argument with the more directly ethical concern that 
although the liberal state should not aim positively to foster virtuous character traits, 
nevertheless it ought not preclude or hinder any citizen’s development towards virtue 
through their own decisions and actions. What’s more, she argues, the state should not 
treat criminal offenders any differently from other citizens in this regard. Sifferd strongly 
criticises two current forms of judicial punishment: the use of isolation and chemical 
castration. She concludes that these practices are politically unjustifiable in a liberal 
context.
Two other authors focus on the relation between character and the will. Roman 
Altshuler (Kutztown University) focuses on the question of exactly how character is 
related to reasoning and deciding, or the will. He points out that most philosophers 
working on motivation focus on either character or the will, but seldom employ both 
concepts. Katharina Bauer (University of Dortmund and Ruhr-Universität) addresses 
the relation between character and the will through the social practice of making ethical 
demands on someone’s decisions and actions. She concludes that the ethics of character 
rests on the tension between seeing each person as an individual and as a member of 
the collective, between the ideals of authenticity, autonomy, and morality.
Three other authors focus on the relation between character and implicit bias. 
Jules Holroyd (University of Sheffield) and Dan Kelly (Purdue University) argue that 
character can cover only those cognitive and behavioural dispositions for which the 
agent can justifiably be held responsible. This raises the question of whether we should 
consider the phenomenon of implicit bias, where behaviour is influenced by a disposi-
tion that the agent is typically unaware of having and might disapprove of, to be an 
aspect of the individual’s character and thus within the scope of personal responsibility. 
Jonathan Webber (one of the editors) continues this discussion of the relation between 
character and implicit bias: his question concerns how we should understand the idea 
of improving one’s own behavioural dispositions. He concludes that moral improvement 
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is a matter of instilling in oneself the right strong evaluative attitudes, which he aligns 
with the Aristotelian idea of habituating ethical virtue.
Christian Miller (Wake Forest University) turns the discussion directly onto the 
detail and development of the cognitive-affective system theory of personality, which 
Webber draws on in his argument and which can be seen as an empirically grounded 
context for many ideas expounded in this volume. He shows that this theory confirms 
some of the central tenets of the common-sense idea of character. Since it rests on 
considerable empirical support and accommodates the findings of situationist experi-
ments in its structure, this is evidence that those experiments do not require us to 
abandon the idea of character. Nevertheless, he argues, the theory does not offer any 
significant theoretical advance over that common-sense idea. Its strength lies not in its 
own articulation of personality, according to Miller, but in the evidence it musters for 
using this theory, whether described in common-sense vocabulary or in technical jargon, 
as a framework for research into motivation and personal traits. Miller closes with some 
suggestions for the directions in which that research should develop.
Mark Alfano (Delft University of Technology) questions an assumption made by 
the other papers in this volume: he explores the idea that aspects of an individual’s social 
situations form constitutive parts of some virtues, not merely the causal background 
against which virtues are developed. He develops his idea of ‘factitious’ virtue, which 
mimics virtue as classically understood without possessing the classic internal structure 
of virtue, through a consideration of trustworthiness. To be factitiously trustworthy, he 
argues, it is sufficient that one is relied upon and wants to live up to the image of one-
self implied by that initial reliance. Alfano concludes that this kind of trustworthiness, 
which may be far more common than the ideal trustworthiness it mimics, is structurally 
analogous to friendship and suggests that this might provide a model for factitious forms 
of other virtues, such as courage or generosity.
Nafsika Athanassoulis (independent researcher, linked with Keele University and 
the University of Leeds) considers the implications of the situationist tradition in exper-
imental social psychology for the idea that education should aim to form the ethical 
character of the students. Educators can shape ongoing character traits through provid-
ing students with carefully structured situational challenges, imparting information about 
the kinds of situational pressures that can undermine one’s ethical aims, and then dis-
cussing the students’ responses in a spirit of collaborative ethical inquiry. The primary 
role of the educator in this process is neither to inform nor to explain, but instead to 
model virtuous behaviour and self-critical reflection.
Alberto Masala (the other editor) concludes that contemporary education has 
become overly concerned with the easily measurable outcome of competence, where 
what is needed to foster better citizens is an education that propagates the psychological 
structures of mastery, or what virtue ethicists have traditionally called practical wisdom.
I consider this volume to be highly interesting, essentially from an academic point 
of view. It is clear that the papers stem from the Anglophone academic context. 
The volume also supports the idea that integrating insights from both analytic and 
Continental philosophy with ongoing empirical research into the psychology of 
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motivation and moral judgment is essential. Therefore, I recommend reading the vol-
ume for those who are – either as philosophers or as psychologists – academically 
interested in the study of character, personality and virtue.
Paul Schotsmans
KU Leuven 
Gottfried schweiger and Gunter grAf (eds.). The Well-Being of Children: Philo-
sophical and Social Scientific Approaches. De Gruyter Open, 2015. 176 pp. 
Are children one of the last oppressed groups in society or are they a vulnerable group 
in need of protection? Should they be autonomous in making decisions about their 
lives or are parents responsible for all decisions about their children? The Well-Being 
of Children: Philosophical and Scientific Approaches edited by Gottfried Schweiger and 
Gunter Graf takes a timely and comprehensive look at the broad topic of children’s 
wellbeing, by merging philosophical perspectives on the topic with a broad set of 
interdisciplinary research results. The book is divided into two sections, the first 
 dealing with conceptual issues, the second focusing on more practical questions related 
to children’s wellbeing. 
The contributions, while covering a lot of territory, all refer back to philosophical 
discussions of wellbeing and/or justice. Hence, at the core of the book is an interdisci-
plinary agenda of how philosophy can learn from other discipline’s research on child 
wellbeing and what philosophy can contribute to an interdisciplinary debate about this 
issue. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the editors reflect in their introduction to 
the volume on a number of areas in which philosophy can contribute to the issue of 
child welfare: from providing conceptual clarity in an interdisciplinary debate over key 
terms, by highlighting that no approach to child welfare is value free and by embedding 
the discussion within the wider field of political and social philosophy. 
Among the volume’s major themes is the question of how childhood is conceptu-
alized in different contexts and a number of chapters discuss such differences in con-
ceptualization and what impacts these differences have on our understanding of child 
wellbeing. Gunter Graf’s contribution entitled “Conceptions of Childhood, Agency and 
the Well-Being of Children” provides a comprehensive framing of current sociological 
debates about childhood and reflects on how those debates might be of interest for 
philosophers. Graf discusses the ‘social construction of childhood’, particularly high-
lighting the tensions between different interpretations of childhood, from conceptions 
that frame children mainly in light of a nexus of vulnerability and protection versus 
views that stress that children are an oppressed group in need of liberation. In the con-
text of these multiple views, he highlights challenges by the latter view of some basic 
assumptions that philosophers have about childhood, particularly those relating to 
autonomy. While he sees the need for philosophers to widen their scope of thinking 
about childhood, acknowledging that childhood is socially constructed, he cautions that 
some constructions of childhood might still be more adequate than others. Taking a 
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different perspective, Tim Moore’s “Keeping Them in Mind” reflects on his research 
interviewing children’s researchers regarding differing conceptualizations of childhood 
and challenges to researching childhood. His research describes a number of ontological, 
epistemological and ethical challenges to childhood research and discusses suggestions 
by researchers of how to deal with some of those challenges.
With the issue of wellbeing at the core of the volume, it includes a fair amount 
of discussion on how to conceptualize and measure wellbeing. One topos that emerges 
more than once from these debates is the tension between children’s wellbeing 
and well-becoming. Bill Gardner’s “The Developmental Capability Model of Child 
Well-Being” tries to rethink how the capability approach applies to children as he 
finds that theorists of justice, including capability theorists, have not sufficiently 
appreciated the importance of the fact that human capabilities develop over time. 
Based on Heckman’s research on children’s capabilities, he argues for the importance 
of the development of kernel capabilities (meaning that they are prerequisite to the 
development of a wide range of other capabilities) in children, with failure to develop 
those capabilities inhibiting the development of further capabilities, thereby restricting 
freedom. Based on this conception, the author provides suggestions how paediatric 
care for children could evolve from a system of acute care to a system monitoring the 
growth of kernel capabilities. Gottfried Schweiger’s “Justice and Children’s Well-Being 
and Well-Becoming” discusses how the concepts of wellbeing and well-becoming of 
children relate to theories of justice. He makes the case that “[…] well-being and well-
becoming can serve as the ultimate goals of justice, as they allow us to better under-
stand the specific needs of children as agents of justice and their embeddedness in 
certain social contexts” (84). Discussing critical theory of recognition and the capabil-
ity approach, the author suggests those capabilities and functionings that comprise the 
wellbeing and well-becoming of children as currency of justice based on an open 
context-sensitive list of capabilities. With regard to rules of distribution, he suggests 
a pluralistic approach, oriented on David Miller’s differentiation between need (suf-
ficiency), equality and desert. These two more theoretical papers are contrasted by a 
number of papers that discuss the question of wellbeing and well-becoming based on 
more applied and/or empirical research. Amy Clair’s “Conceptualising Child versus 
Adult Well-Being: Schooling and Employment” draws on the parallels and differences 
between subjective wellbeing of children in education and adults in the workplace, 
focusing on research from the UK and USA. Looking at the link between subjective 
wellbeing, engagement and productivity in adult workplaces, she argues for greater 
consideration of children’s subjective wellbeing in schools, equivalent to that of adults 
in employment.
Mar Cabezas’ “Children’s Mental Well-Being and Education” discusses how a 
holistic understanding of health as wellbeing, including mental health, challenges the way 
current school education works. Based on this analysis, she discusses a number of 
attempts to include psychological education programmes in school (emotional education 
programmes, cognitive programmes, and social and creativity education programmes). 
The author argues that while those programmes are helpful for children they are not 
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successful in an institutional sense as they are usually not included in the official public 
school curricula. Further, she suggests that they should be holistically integrated with 
moral and philosophical education as they are based on underlying values such as human 
rights that are not usually discussed openly in such programmes. Concluding the reflec-
tion on child wellbeing is a chapter by Matteo D’Emilione, Giovannina Giuliano and 
Paloma Vivaldi Vera entitled “Will Children of Social Care Services Users be Future 
Users? Results of a Pilot Research in Rome” in which the authors discuss the results of 
a primary data collection survey on the poverty of social care services users in a district 
of Rome, with a specific focus on households with children. Based on an original model 
of multidimensional analysis of poverty, the survey is based on the theoretical frame-
work of the capability approach. Results highlight the heterogeneity of situations that 
can be found within the researched groups with regard to deprivation, which according 
to the authors makes it difficult for social service providers and policy makers to find 
the right kind of interventions, without the appropriate tools, one of which could be the 
author’s model.
Another recurring issue in the book is the tension between parents’ authority over 
children and children’s autonomy and where the boundaries between those two should 
be drawn. Tatjana Višak’s “Does Welfare Trump Freedom? A Normative Evaluation 
of Contextualism About How to Promote Welfare” discusses this in the context of 
childhood obesity, defending the viewpoint of contextualism that states that welfare is 
not only a matter of individual choice but importantly a matter of being situated in the 
right social and physical context. She claims that in the case of childhood obesity pre-
vention contextualism warrants limiting children’s option freedoms, with concerns for 
children’s welfare trumping claims for children’s autonomy. Alexander Bagattini’s 
“Male Circumcision and Children’s Interests” discusses the tension between parents’ 
and children’s rights concerning the issue of male circumcision. Endorsing the ‘liberal 
standard’ according to which parents have the right to make decisions on behalf of 
their children as long as they act in the best interest of their children, the author 
analyses Mazor’s defence of circumcision and claims that he succeeds in the case of 
children’s interests in bodily integrity and sexual flourishing, but fails to properly 
address the child’s interest in autonomy, since children cannot give informed consent. 
As circumcision is an irreversible bodily modification, the author argues that in line 
with a liberal tradition that takes autonomy as a precondition, circumcision is morally 
objectionable.
The volume under review provides a good mix between theoretical and empirical 
discussions that will not only provide some new perspectives for philosophers interested 
in the issue of children’s wellbeing, but should also be of interest to non-philosophers 
who are interested in questions of wellbeing and justice and how they relate to children. 
As a good number of research papers are based on the capability approach, researchers 
that work with or are interested in working with this approach might benefit from 
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R. Jay wAllAce, Rahul kumAr and Samuel freemAn (eds.). Reasons and Recogni-
tion: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 408 pp.
This volume dedicated to Thomas Scanlon’s work in moral and political philosophy 
reads like a grand assembly of brilliant pockets of thought. It consists of fifteen chap-
ters, written by both established and more junior researchers, in which various aspects 
of Scanlon’s work are elaborated on, illuminated or criticized. Scanlon’s contribution 
to contemporary analytic philosophy is as deep as it is wide-ranging. He is best known 
for his development of a version of moral contractualism, stating that an action is 
wrong when disallowed by principles that no one could reasonably reject. Only two of 
the fifteen chapters have contractualism as their subject. One might be tempted to see 
debates about Scanlon’s views on responsibility, tolerance, the nature of values, moral 
motivation as sub-debates in the shadow of his systematic defence of moral contractu-
alism. But in fact all of Scanlon’s writings attract considerable attention, and even for 
researchers who are averse to the very idea of a moral system, there is a great deal to 
learn from his analysis of the moral practice. Scanlon’s work on more phenomeno-
logical aspects of moral life is as insightful as his work on the theoretical underpinnings 
of moral principles. While the latter is at the heart of his magnum opus What We Owe 
To Each Other, the former is exemplified in a less well-known but truly engaging book 
Moral Dimensions (which includes Scanlon’s views on blame and the meaning of an 
action). Apart from these two monographs, he has written various articles on topics in 
political philosophy (collected in the volume The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political 
Philosophy), and most recently he defended his meta-ethical theory in Being Realistic about 
Reasons. This last book appeared after the dedicated volume was published, but the fact 
that Scanlon defends a realist theory of normative reasons was already clear from 
 earlier work.
The very first contribution to Reason and Recognition, by Christine Korsgaard, takes 
issue with Scanlon’s normative realism. On the basis of Scanlon’s defence of moral 
contractualism one might be inclined to attribute a Kantian sympathy to Scanlon, but 
in many ways he is not a Kantian at all. Scanlon does not find it necessary, for example, 
to postulate free will in order to make sense of agency or moral responsibility. More to 
the point of Korsgaard’s chapter, Scanlon thinks of reasons as mind-independent facts 
to be discovered by human reasoning, which Korsgaard discards in favour of normative 
constructivism which ascribes (in a Kantian vein) a creative rather than a receptive role 
to reason. In line with his normative realism, Scanlon rejects the notion of an attitude-
based reason. He does not think that attitudes like a desire or an intention could give 
rise to reasons. In his contribution to the volume, Niko Kolodny sides with Scanlon and 
examines why many philosophers are drawn towards the view that intentions create 
reasons. Kolodny argues that the fact that an agent cares about a project does not give 
the agent a reason to pursue the project, but that the caring does constitute a value 
which in its turn bases a reason to pursue the project. Michael Smith’s chapter is meant 
not to corroborate but to put pressure on Scanlon’s rejection of attitude-based reasons. 
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Smith traces this rejection back to Scanlon’s claim that attitudes like desires are 
themselves responses to reasons. For example, when you desire to drink the glass of 
water in front of you, your desire, according to Scanlon, is a response to the pleasure 
anticipated in drinking the glass. Smith objects that Scanlon overlooks a class of desires 
that cannot be described as a response to reasons, namely the unmotivated or intrinsic 
desires. Think of a basic urge like thirst. It is this intrinsic desire, together with the belief 
that water will quench your thirst that gives rise to the motivated desire to drink a glass 
of water. The latter desire is based on reasons, but the former is not; on the contrary, 
(motivating) reasons are based on it.
Thus the first part of the volume (entitled Reason, Value and Desire) deals with 
implications of Scanlon’s meta-ethical position. The second part of the volume (called 
Ethical Themes: Contractualism. Promissory Obligation, and Tolerance) contains the two chapters 
on contractualism, together with two other papers on Scanlon’s normative ethics. 
The third part is called Political Themes: Conservatism, Justice, and Public Reason. Within the 
confines of this book review I will only be able to further summarize the three papers 
that make up the fourth part of the volume: Responsibility.
According to Scanlon the judgment that a person is blameworthy for an action 
amounts to the judgment that the person holds attitudes that impair his or her rela-
tions with others. To blame the person is to adapt one’s own attitudes towards that 
person accordingly. Scanlon’s account of blame does not assume resentment or any 
other emotion to be a necessary ingredient of blame. Nor does it assume free will. 
When a person A betrays another person B, it does not matter to B whether A freely 
chose to betray him or her. The fact remains that he or she will no longer invite A 
for a beer, for example. In the volume, three well-known authors in the domain of 
free will and responsibility describe their disagreement with Scanlon. The judgment 
of an impaired relationship is not necessary let alone essential to blame, argues Susan 
Wolf. As a vivid counterexample she describes episodes of angered blame between 
spouses or between parents and children. When her daughter raids her closet without 
asking, Wolf blames her but she does not think for a minute that their relationship is 
impaired. Gary Watson on the other hand reflects on the difficult case of the psycho-
path in which he thinks blame is not appropriate, though the judgment of an impaired 
relationship surely is. Whether or not it is inappropriate to blame a psychopath is of 
course controversial. And the reader might find it something of an advantage that 
Scanlon provides us with a way to make sense of blaming a psychopath without 
assuming free will or moral competence. In the very last contribution to the volume, 
Jay Wallace also examines the idea whether the judgment of an impaired relationship 
is sufficient to warrant or to give rise to blame. Like Wolf, he believes that emotions 
are crucial to blame, and that by leaving out reactive attitudes Scanlon leaves out what 
is vital.
In the preface, the editors observe that the selected topics reflect the full range of 
Scanlon’s interests. That is not quite true (there is no discussion of Scanlon’s arguments 
against the Doctrine of Double Effect, nor of his defence of non-naturalism, for exam-
ple) but one could hardly hold this against them since the volume is already wide-ranging 
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enough as it is. A fairer point of criticism is the regrettable lack of an overall introduc-
tion to Scanlon’s work. The preface to the volume lists the topics selected, but does not 
explain the argumentative coherence between them. As I said at the beginning of my 
review, the volume reads as a collection of pockets of thought, seemingly unrelated at 
times but all brilliant and worth reading in their own right.
Katrien Schaubroeck
University of Antwerp
